South Korea’s Next President. Lee Jae-myung’s Economic Pragmatism and the Shadow of Illiberalism

Lee Jae-myung’s recent invocation of Park Chung-hee in economic discourse is more than mere rhetorical flourish—it is a calculated political maneuver. By aligning himself with Park’s legacy of state-led development and industrialization, Lee signals a strategic shift toward the political center. This move suggests a recognition that ideological purity has diminishing utility amid mounting economic anxieties. It also underscores the enduring resonance of Park’s mythos in the Korean political imagination, particularly among older and centrist voters who associate him with modernization, if not democratization.

Lee’s pivot to moderation is evident throughout his evolving economic platform. The once-central promise of a universal basic income—a hallmark of his 2022 presidential campaign—has quietly faded into the background. Pressured by inflation, fiscal constraints, and criticism from both conservatives and cautious progressives, Lee has replaced grand redistribution with more targeted welfare and industrial policies. These changes align with broader global post-pandemic priorities: resilience, productivity, and disciplined public spending.

His stance on labor has also tempered. While maintaining rhetorical support for workers, he has abandoned the combative tone of previous campaigns. Instead, his messaging now seeks a balance between labor rights and economic stability—reassuring middle-class voters and business interests wary of overregulation.

Even Lee’s tax policy reflects this pragmatic shift. Rather than the redistributive promises typical of progressive platforms, he exercises notable caution—mindful of alienating moderates in an already fragile economic climate. Though this centrism blurs traditional partisan lines, it mirrors global trends in advanced democracies where ideological boundaries are increasingly fluid.

In the United States, President Joe Biden has championed large-scale industrial policy through initiatives like the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act—policies once considered the domain of economic nationalism. The United Kingdom under Boris Johnson saw the Conservative Party embrace expansive public spending and regional development through the "levelling up" agenda, echoing concerns historically voiced by Labour. France’s Emmanuel Macron has consistently defied ideological categorization, blending market reforms with state investment in climate and digital sectors. Meanwhile, Germany’s coalition government—uniting Social Democrats, Greens, and Free Democrats—reflects an ideologically diverse but pragmatically focused governance model. These examples demonstrate a broader international shift: political leaders are prioritizing flexibility over dogma in response to economic and geopolitical volatility.

This pattern of adaptation under structural pressure has historical precedent. In France, President François Mitterrand’s Socialist government initiated a dramatic ideological reversal in 1983. After launching a radical left-wing agenda in 1981—nationalizations, welfare expansion, and monetary loosening—the administration faced inflation, capital flight, and a destabilized franc. Forced to choose between protectionist socialism and European integration, Mitterrand chose austerity, marking the "tournant de la rigueur" (austerity turn) that realigned the Socialist Party toward market orthodoxy and foreshadowed social democracy’s broader neoliberal shift across Europe.

Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) followed a similar, albeit more gradual, trajectory. Under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the SPD began moving away from Keynesianism toward fiscal conservatism. This evolution culminated in the early 2000s with Gerhard Schröder’s Agenda 2010, which embraced labor market liberalization and welfare reform. Like Mitterrand’s France, Germany’s center-left came to accept economic liberalism under the weight of globalization, inflation, and European integration.

The common thread across these cases is clear: structural pressures—capital mobility, inflation, and the demands of global interdependence—discipline ideological ambition. Lee Jae-myung appears to have absorbed this lesson.

I welcome Lee’s turn toward economic moderation. It reflects realism in policymaking and a willingness to adapt to evolving economic challenges. Still, the sincerity of this shift has been questioned by conservative critics. My own analysis is that Lee is less a progressive-socialist ideologue than a populist nationalist—more akin to Donald Trump’s “America First” ethos than to doctrinaire leftism. This makes him ideologically flexible, but also raises a deeper concern.

That concern is Lee’s attitude toward constitutional norms and constraints on executive power. Under his leadership, the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) has wielded its legislative majority with unprecedented force. Since President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in 2022, the DPK has initiated 29 impeachment motions against government officials, 13 of which have passed. To put this in perspective: in the nearly eight decades since the founding of the Republic, only 16 impeachment motions had succeeded prior to Yoon’s presidency.

Even more troubling is the DPK’s proposal to expand the Supreme Court from 14 to 30 justices following a 2025 court ruling ordering a retrial in one of Lee’s criminal cases. This court-packing proposal, critics warn, poses a grave threat to judicial independence. The impeachment targeting of Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae over alleged election interference further deepens fears of democratic erosion.

Lee’s record also includes prior attempts to suppress dissenting scholarship. As mayor of Seongnam in 2015, he publicly denounced Professor Park Yu-ha—author of Comfort Women of the Empire—as a “pro-Japanese remnant that must be eradicated” and lamented “breathing under the same sky” as her after her book was banned (NewsCulture, 2015). Such rhetoric betrays an intolerance for academic freedom and historical debate.

In sum, Lee Jae-myung’s policy flexibility is real, and his economic moderation is commendable. Yet his willingness to undermine democratic norms when they prove inconvenient is equally real—and deeply troubling. As South Korea navigates both economic uncertainty and democratic fragility, voters must assess not only the policies of those seeking office, but also their respect for the rule of law and institutional limits.

Economic pragmatism is a virtue—but only when paired with constitutional restraint. Voters should demand both.